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Introduction  
 
The changing landscape of the relationship of the European Union to the group of African, 
Caribbean and Pacific developing countries (ACP states) is harshly criticized in these days. 
The majority of the criticism is formulated by official, independent and non-governmental or-
ganizations such as Oxfam (2002, 2006), Bilal / Rampa (2006) and Karingi et al. (2005). 
These authors highlight the negative effects of the European trade policy toward associated 
developing countries, implemented in the future Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). 
Being part of the latest agreement signed in 2000 in Cotonou / Benin between the EU 
and 78 of a total of 79 associated ACP partners, these EPAs introduce a new era of economic 
co-operation. Up to now the ACP countries have benefited from non-reciprocal trade prefer-
ences, but with regard to non-ACP countries these unilateral trade preferences infringe the 
non-discrimination principle of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). With regard to the ex-
piration of the WTO waiver tolerating the unilateral EU-ACP trade preferences by the end of 
2007 and considering the WTO membership of the EU and most of the ACP countries, the 
framework of the economic co-operation has to be redesigned.  
With reference to the WTO principles, the new economic relationship that the EU is 
actually negotiating with six ACP regions should be based on reciprocity instead of 
unilateralism.  
Although the EPA agenda which is negotiated individually with every single region 
may differ between the ACP regions, five key challenges are addressed in the talks: (1) 
improving market access preferences of the ACPs to the EU, (2) strengthening regional in-
tegration, productivity, trade capacity and development, (3) considering the development 
status and need of protection of single economic sectors while opening the market, (4) 
securing coherence between trade and development and (5) supporting ACP regions through a 
trade-related development co-operation.  
With regard to the EPA agenda, the EU apparently tries to recollect one main target set in 
1963
1. It tries to foster the economic development of its associated partners and to support 
their sustainable introduction in the international trade arena. Indeed, the ACPs share in 
international trade declined continuously since the 1950s, especially in Africa
2. 
 As African ACP countries show a fragile and weak economic performance, the EU’s 
insistence on the implementation of reciprocal trade relations is not necessarily to the 
advantage of these countries. Instead of concentrating on purely trade-related relations in 
accordance with the GATT and GATS rules, it is criticized that a regulation similar to the old 
WTO waiver regulations might better conform to the development objectives of African 
countries.  
In order to come to a better understanding of how to formulate a feasible agenda for 
EPA negotiations which is satisfying developed and developing countries, one aspect should 
be considered more intensively: the influence of the historical incidents on the formation and 
success of today’s different regional integration blocs among ACP countries and its potential 
relevance for the agenda of the ongoing EPA talks.  
The aim of this paper is to give an insight in one sustainable and far-reaching regional 
integration union among developing countries in West Africa
3, the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (WAEMU).  
 
The paper is organized as follows: against the background of a recapitulation of the theory of 
trade and regional integration in section 1, the empirical validity of the theoretical motives 
and main objectives of such a regional co-operation is analysed in section 2 based on a 
                                                 
1    See Communauté Européenne 1963, article 1. 
2    See UNCTAD 2000. 
3   Even though the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) represents West Africa in the      
    EPA talks, the WAEMU is an equal partner in these talks.    3
retrospective of the integration process of the West African region. Section 3 highlights the 
actual economic policy and the stability of the WAEMU and tries to identify potential 
problematical areas in the WAEMU which has to be considered in the current EPA talks.  
 
Development through regional integration  
 
The range of challenges developing countries have to face is complex and so are the ap-
proaches of different scientific disciplines when it comes to analysis and the elaboration of re-
commendations. Regardless of that variety, a key aspect of the development debate is the 
implementation of a sustainable economic development in the countries in question.   
From an economic perspective, the first and more prevalent theoretical approach is the 
analysis of trade relations between countries and the potential impacts on their development, 
however.  
Taking into account the changing landscape of international trade and its tendency to re-
gionalisation and considering the integration process of the European Union and the intended 
adoption of EPAs, the analysis of trade-interaction within the framework of regional inte-
gration theory gains in importance.  
 
The predominant motive for entering a regional integration is mainly economic which sug-
gests that regional integration can be considered not only as a theoretical approach, but as an 
important strategy in order to reduce and finally abolish tariff and non-tariff barriers. 
Following Dalibor (1997: 80) this conclusion seems to be correct when he states that 
agreements on regional integration include the discriminating elimination of trade barriers and 
the implementation of specific coordination and co-operation elements between the member 
states.  
The different steps partners can take on the integration ladder in order to ameliorate and foster 
their regional economic situation are shown in figure 1.  
 
Degree of   
Integration     
                         political union  
   
             economic and/or monetary union 
 
             common market 
 
             customs union  
 
                         free trade area  
 
         preferential  
           area 
 
        Loss of national sovereignty 
Source: following Fischer/Straubhaar 1994: 59. 
 
Figure 1  Possible forms of regional integration  
 
The preferential area is the weakest form of integration as it compasses only a unilateral or 
reciprocal reduction of trade barriers of specific goods or group of goods. The free trade area, 
the simplest and loosest integration, is characterized by an elimination of trade barriers 
between the partners and the maintenance of an individual foreign trade policy towards third 
countries. Even though the political and economic integration is low, the respect of the rules 
of origin limits the free trade. In contrast to the free trade area, the introduction of a common 
foreign policy with uniform tariffs and duties towards imports of third countries in customs   4
union is one option to solve the problem with the rules of origin. The national sovereignty 
and the pursuance of national interests in the domain of foreign affairs are curtailed in favour 
of a common decision-making process. The next step on the integration ladder is the realisa-
tion of a common market with the free movement of persons, goods, capital and services, 
respectively. The implementation of this free movement demands more co-ordination and co-
operation from the member states and the harmonisation of the different economic policies in 
the areas in question. A monetary union is attached to the implementation of a common 
monetary policy with a common currency, whereas the economic union requires a unification 
of monetary, fiscal and social policies which is binding to the participating parties
4. This 
principle implicitly approves the priority of supranational to national law and the gradual loss 
of national sovereignty when joining an economic union. Out of this intensive form of 
economic co-operation the need for further harmonisation in other specific sectors can evolve 
and favour the formation of a political union. The political union symbolizes the highest form 
of regional integration and co-operation. It is characterized by a high loss of national 
sovereignty in favour of the implementation of a federal order and a complex institutional 
structure for the co-ordination of the common policies. 
 
The motives for integration on a regional basis are not limited to trade-related aspects only. 
The consideration of monetary aspects contributes to a better understanding of the economic 
complexity of a regional integration and opens the floor for a broader and deeper economic 
analysis. In this paper, the analysis of the linkage between economic and monetary aspects 
will concentrate on trade- and development-related topics only.  
 
The interaction of political, economic and monetary motives has to be considered when it 
comes to the regional- and country-based impact assessment.  
 
The political motives for joining or founding an integrated regional bloc are often influenced 
or dominated by objectives coming from the foreign policy and security sector. In addition to 
the contribution to political stability as a result of the interaction of several countries, the wish 
for reform can also be an important aspect as it becomes more credible within the framework 
of regional co-operation and is therefore easier to be translated into action
5. The regional in-
tegration can be very attractive to small countries as it increases their political and economic 
negotiation power vis-à-vis larger economic blocs
6.  
 
The decision to form a regional bloc is also based on economic aspects, mainly in generating 
welfare effects with the help of income, efficiency and trade-creating effects
7. Countries who 
decide to create or join a regional bloc can reduce their trade-related transaction costs and 
have the possibility to trade their goods in a larger market than without any form of integra-
tion
8.  
The reduction of the transaction costs can induce several additional positive effects: first, the 
enlargement of the regional market benefits the use of dynamic economies of scale as the 
production volume increases and the production costs per unit decrease. On one side, this can 
lead to the production of capital-intensive goods if the critical market size is attained. On the 
other side, these economies of scale can also be an incentive to start infrastructure projects 
between the cooperating countries
9.  
Secondly, the increase of trading possibilities and the intensified competitiveness can amelior-
ate the economic performance of the partners if they are willing and open to face the chal-
lenges of technological progress and innovation pressure with the help of an efficiency-ori-
                                                 
4    See Dalibor 1997: 82. 
5    See Kritzinger-van Niekerk 2005: 2. 
6    See Shams 2002: 7.  
7    See Dalibor 1997: 86. 
8    See Schiff / Winters 2002: 72.  
9    See Kritzinger-van Niekerk 2005: 2.    5
ented re-organization of the production procedure. In that context, the benefit is not limited to 
the production side, the consumers gain from a diversified good supply and from price reduc-
tion which releases their spending power. The positive results of trade creation and the ameli-
oration of production and income surpluses can only occur if intraregional comparative ad-
vantages come to fruition within the regional bloc
10. If the regional partners close their com-
mon market against cheaper goods coming from third countries by retaining their current or 
imposing higher tariffs on these goods, this trade diversion or suppression increases the risk 
of welfare losses on both sides, the regional partners and third countries, respectively.  
Thirdly, the preconditions to benefit from spillover effects, especially those of a technical 
origin, are better within the framework of regional co-operations. The improvement of the 
inner-regional efficiency resulting from the dynamic economies of scale, trade creation and 
spillover effects can, fourthly, contribute to an increase of region's global competitiveness. 
Lastly, the need to establish and respect a specific set of rules within a regional bloc fosters 
the credibility and transparency in and of the region and increases its attractiveness for 
domestic and foreign investments
11.   
 
The potential economic effects mentioned above can be influenced by monetary aspects, 
positively or negatively, respectively. The harmonisation of monetary conditions in a regional 
bloc such as the implementation of a common exchange rate policy with fixed exchange rates 
can,  firstly, minimize the volatility of large fluctuations in currency prices and, second, 
stabilize the expectations on financial markets. Dependent from the openness of the regional 
bloc, its attractiveness for foreign direct investments will gain parallel to the increase of the 
transparency of the market. In addition to that, the monetary co-operation can contribute to a 
reduction of transaction costs, liquidity preferences, interest rates and price discrimination
12. 
On the other hand, the creation of a development-friendly ambience and the potential 
improvement of the region’s economic performance contrast with the loss of a sovereign 
monitoring and active correction of the exchange rate. A sovereign exchange rate policy 
might be advantageous if an external shock occurs or the negative effects of a bad economic 
policy (e.g. pro-cyclical fiscal policy like high public expenditures in economically good 
times which are followed by an increase of the budget deficit) have to be diminished
13. 
 
Against this theoretical background, the next section outlines the different steps the franco-
phone West African countries took on the integration ladder. The analysis concentrates on the 
motives and forms of integration and skips the assessment of trade and development aspects.  
 
Retrospective of the regional integration process in francophone West Africa 
 
The foundation of the WAEMU in 1994 was the result of a long lasting integration process 
which dates back to the colonial era when seven of the eight WAEMU member states have 
tried to enhance their regional integration within different unions.      
 
The Monetary Integration  
 
In the middle of the 19
th century, France introduced the French franc (FF) as a legal currency 
in its colonies. Controlled by the French administration, local private banks in the colonies 
were allowed to issue the colonial franc. 
After World War I and with regard to the growing importance of the trade relations between 
France and its colonies, the French central bank, Banque de France, guaranteed the exchange 
                                                 
10  See Dalibor 1997: 91. 
11   See Dalibor 1997: 93. 
12    See Tomann 2007: 17f. 
13    Ibid.   6
of colonial franc to the franc métropolitain, the currency of the French Empire, at a fixed par-
ity
14.  
As a countermove to the fixed parity, the colonial banks of issue were obliged to conclude 
their foreign exchange transactions on operation accounts held by the Banque de France
15. 
Additionally, they had to pursue a restrictive, non-inflationary monetary policy
16.  
 
On the eve of World War II, the inconvertibility of the French franc and the introduction of a 
foreign exchange control regime in 1939 delimited the geographical area within which the dif-
ferent francophone currencies remained convertible
17.  
As a result of the monetary reform of December 26, 1945 a new common currency was intro-
duced in the African colonies, the Franc des Colonies Françaises d’Afrique (F CFA). The F 
CFA was issued by the French overseas central bank (Caisse Centrale de la France d’Outre 
Mer). Throughout the period from 1948 to 1994 the convertibility the F CFA to the FF re-
mained stable at an exchange rate of 0,5 F CFA to 1 FF
18.  
 
In the course of the decolonisation process (1954-1962) the African francophone countries 
opted for the maintenance of the monetary co-operation between France and them. In 1959 
the existing currency partnership consisted of two F CFA zones, the Central African  F CFA 
(franc de la Coopération Financière Africaine) and the West African F CFA zone (franc de la 
Communauté Financière Africaine), respectively. With the independence of the Comores in 
1976 the franc zone was enlarged by the franc comorien. All three currencies were issued by 




In April 1959, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey (now Benin), Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), 
Mauritania, Niger and Senegal created a common central bank, the Banque Centrale des États 
de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO). The BCEAO was responsible for the emission of the West 
African F CFA
20.  
The West African Monetary Union (WAMU) was founded by the BCEAO member states in 
May 1962 and joined by Togo in 1963 and Mali in 1967
21. Its constituting treaty was only 
ratified by November 14, 1973 with the absence of Mauritania
22.  
The monetary co-operation between France and the WAMU was settled on December 4, 1973 
and had to respect the following principles
23:  
 
1.  unrestricted convertibility guaranteed by the French Treasury for the entire franc 
zone; 
2.  free capital mobility between the franc zone and France;  
                                                 
14   See Banque de France 2002:2. 
15   See Ziemer 1993: 253. 
16   See Abdel-Salam 1970 : 340. 
17   See Banque de France 2002: 2. 
18   See Hadjimichael/ Galy 1997: 6. The exchange rate of the F CFA to the franc métropolitain (FM) remained  
      the same after the after the currency reform in 1968. The change from franc métropolitain to franc français  
      (FF) required the alignment of the exchange rate of the F CFA to the new FF. The parity was of 50 F CFA to  
  1 FF (ibid). The franc des colonies françaises du Pacifique (CFP) was introduced in the francophone 
colonies in the Pacific. Its parity was of 1 CFP to 5,5 FM (see Banque de France 2002: 2f.). 
19   See Banque de France 2002: 4f.  
20   See Banque de France 2002: 3f.  
21   See Banque de France 2002: 4.  Mali left the UMOA in 1962, but wanted to re-join it in 1967 (Banque de  
      France 2002: 4 and Treydte 1973: 14). With the demand of re-application, Mali had to devalue its currency,  
      the franc malien, by 50% (see Ziemer 1993: 253). Mali obtained its full membership on June, 1 1984 after  
      having assigned the privilege of currency issue to the BCEAO (see Banque de France 2002: 4). 
22   See Afriqueweb.   
23   See Banque de France 2002:10. The treaty of the monetary co-operation between France and the UMOAwas  
      signed in 1973, but came into force on January 22 1984 (see République française 2004).   7
3.  free convertibility of the two different F CFA and the franc comorien within the 
franc zone at a fixed parity; 
4.  centralization of the foreign exchange reserves transactions, e.g. the associated 
African states had to maintain at least 65 % of their foreign assets on their opera-
tion accounts with the French Treasury. These foreign assets benefited from a 
currency guarantee within the special drawing rights regime of the IMF
24.  
 
Even though the French Treasury observed the foreign exchange transactions on the operation 
accounts at any time
25 and, considering the fact of the unlimited cover of these accounts, the 
functioning of the principles mentioned above was backed up by an additional safety net.   
In order to keep a strict monetary discipline and to avoid an unsustainable debt position the 
West African central bank had to stick to the following preventive measures
26:  
 
1.  If the balance between the net foreign assets and the sight liabilities of the central 
bank goes below the limit of 20 percent for three consecutive months, the council 
administration of the central bank has to normalize the balance with the adoption 
of appropriate measures such as the increase of the central bank's interest rate or 
the refinancing rate. 
2.  In the case of an occurring illiquidity of its operation accounts the statute of the 
BCEAO foresees the withdrawal of its own foreign assets (except French franc) 
held in the operations account. Additionally, the BCEAO has to demand the trans-
fer of the foreign assets held by privates and officials in its member states in ex-
change for F CFA
27 and it has to invite its member states to execute their special 
drawing rights at the IMF.  
3.  The BCEAO is allowed to provide credits to the government of its member states 
in the limit of 20 percent of the country's government revenue of the previous 
year.  
 
France’s influence on and its insight in the monetary policy of its former colonies is not lim-
ited to the supervision of the operation accounts.  
The BCEAO is represented in each of its member states by an agency and a sub-committee, 
the Comité National du Crédit. Each West African member state and France sends one repres-
entative to the seven national credit committees
28. 
On the basis of majority decisions, these committees control the national borrowings and fix 




With France guaranteeing a fixed parity for the F CFA and the independence of the BCEAO 
against political influences
30, the WAMU was able to pursue a continuous monetary policy 
with a low inflation rate
31.  
Following the theoretical argumentation, a low inflation rate enables the improvement of the 
real terms of trade and diminishes the expectations of future devaluations in order to stabilize 
                                                 
24   After the introduction of the Euro, France maintains the currency guarantee of the F CFA (see Banque de  
      France 2002: 10).  
25   See République française 2004. 
26   See Banque de France 2002: 11. A description of the functioning of the safeguard measures of the other  
      central banks is described in Banque de France 2002: 11.   
27   See BCEAO 1962, article 18 section 1. 
28   See BCEAO 1962, article 53.  In 1997 Guinea Bissau joined the WAEMU and BCEAO. By then the country  
      also had a BCEAO agency and a national credit committee on its territory. 
29   See BCEAO 1962, articles 56 and 58. In the occurring case of a stalemate the chairman’s vote is predomi- 
      nant (see BCEAO 1962, article 55 section 5).  
30   See BCEA 1962, article 4 section 1. According to Treydte (1973: 16) France can sway the decision of the  
      BCEAO with its 1/3 majority in the council administration. The status of the BCEAO and the UMOA treaty  
      do not proof such an opportunity (see BCEAO 1962 and UMOA 1973). 
31   See Lavergne 1996: 21.   8
the economic and monetary situation of a country or region. In contrast to that, the need to 
devaluate the currency increases the inflation rate if no other economic counter-measures are 
implemented.     
Against this background and despite the potential positive effects of the “import” of monetary 
stability, the inability of devaluing the F CFA without France’s consent was accompanied by 
the fact that the impact of potential advantages of a monetary union was limited in the 
WAMU. The promotion of intraregional trade and investment fell short of expectations. So 
did the minimization of the transaction risks and costs
32.  
Due to the sub-optimal harmonization of the national politics and a persistent stability 
problem, the improvement of commercial relations in francophone West Africa remained at a 
low level between 1959 and 1994
33. The unsatisfying economic integration forwarded the 




The Economic Integration 
 
The Conseil de l’Entente 
 
In 1959, in the course of the decolonisation process, the West African Federation (Afrique 
Occidentale Française, AOF) fell into two political blocks. The short lasting Mali Federation 
with Mali and Senegal on one side, and its institutional and political counterpart the Sahel-
Benin-Union with the Ivory Coast, the main initiator for building this union, Dahomey (now 
Benin), Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and Niger on the other side. The Sahel-Benin-Union 
changed its name into Conseil de l'Entente the same year and was joined by Togo in 1966
35. 
 
The alliance between the two Sahel countries, Upper Volta and Niger, and the two coastal 
countries, the Ivory Coast and Dahomey, was more than obvious if one considers their long 
lasting integration. Since the time of the AOF, the coastal areas were and to some extent still 
are the main destination points for labour migrants coming from the Sahel zone. According to 
their geographical position and taking into account their importance in foreign trade, these 
countries have been the main transfer point for imports and exports of the region and from 
third countries
36.   
 
Seeing itself as a political and economic union
37, the main objectives of the Conseil de l'En-
tente were the harmonisation of its member states policies and the realisation of development 
projects within its borders
38.  
One development project was to coordinate the member states' competences and efforts and to 
strengthen the international competitiveness of the tourism sector in francophone West Africa. 
The promotion of the landscape, the flora and fauna, the lifestyle and the harmonisation of the 
hunting, tariff and police formalities were part of this project
39.  
 
Considering itself as a free trade area with a common external tariff and unified harbour, 
railway and highway sector policies
40, the Conseil de l’Entente gave up its political aims in 
favour of economic ones
41. Furthermore, after the transformation of the solidarity fund
42 into 
                                                 
32   Ibid.  
33   Ibid. For detailed information see sub-sections of the economic integration.  
34   See Lavergne 1996: 21, 44. 
35   See Baumhögger 1988: 481. 
36   See Church 1969: 54.  
37   See Treydte 1973: 18.   
38   See Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européenne, Objectifs.   
39   See Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européenne, Historique.  
40   See Treydte 1973: 19. 
41   See Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européenne, Objectifs.   
42   The member states should surmount their budgetary deficits with the help of the solidarity fund (see Church    9
an aid and solidarity fund in 1966, the development issue became more important
43. Little and 
medium-sized enterprises, foreign agricultural investments and the tourism sector were 
financially supported within the framework of the aid and solidarity fund (Fonds d'Entraide et 
de Garantie des Emprunts du Conseil de l'Entente (FEGECE))
44.  
Profiting from the long lasting border disputes between Dahomey and Niger which led to a 
deviation of the labour migration and the trade flows from the Sahel to the Ivory Coast and 
being the most important contributor to the FEGECE
45, the Ivory Coast was able to enlarge its 
influence within union continually.  
Whilst the Conseil de l'Entente is still in power, one of its five special organizations, the 
Communauté Économique du Bétail et de la Vente (CEBV) which is responsible for the im-
plementation of a uniform livestock promotion and production, was incorporated in the 
WAEMU in 1994 on France's advise
46. 
 
The West African Customs Union  
 
Despite the political discrepancies between the single West African states and the block build-
ing mentioned above, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Mali, Mauretania, Niger, Upper Volta and 
Senegal joined together and founded the West African Customs Union (Union Douanière de 
l’Afrique de l’Ouest, UDAO) on June 9, 1959. The UDAO was the direct successor of the 
West African Federation (AOF)
47.  
The full realization of the intended customs union was mainly delayed by the rivalry between 
the two economic and political powerful UDAO members Senegal and the Ivory Coast. Leav-
ing the leadership problem unsolved, the economic co-operation was reorganized in 1966 and 
the UDAO was replaced by the Customs Union of West African States (Union Douanière des 
États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, UDEAO)
48. 
The new union intended to maintain and to foster the trade relations of its member states by 
reducing the import tariffs of the products being fabricated within the UDEAO region
49. 
Another purpose of the UDEAO was the implementation of the following measures
50: 
 
-  Introduction of common external tariffs
51 for products coming from third 
countries, except member countries of the franc zone and the European 
Community who benefited from preferential tariffs; 
-  Introduction of an internal duty of 50 percent for products coming from third 
countries which are similar to UDEAO products. The member states were free to 
raise the duty up to 70 percent in the case their industries were threatened by the 
imported goods; 
                                                                                                                                                          
      1969: 55). 
43   See Treydte 1973: 19. 
44   See Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européenne, Structure and Treydte 1973: 19.   
45   See Treydte 1973: 19 and Church 1969: 54.  
46   See Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européenne, Structure. Within the framework of technical and finan- 
      cial co-operation between France and the Conseil de l’Entente, the CEBV was transferred to the WAEMU on  
      France’s advice (see Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européenne, Relations bilatérales). Being in charge  
      of the equipment of the tourism sector, the Sorentente was controlled by national authorities from 1985 on  
      and two special units of the Conseil de l’Entente being transferred to the ECOWAS, only the Ivorian educa- 
      tion and formation centre (Centre Régional de l’Enseignement et de l’Apprentissage ) remained in the Con- 
      seil de l’Entente (see Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européenne, Structure).  
47   See Treydte 1973: 23. See Baumhögger 1988: 481f. 
48   See Baumhögger 1988: 481f. 
49   See Tamboura 1972: 313.   
50   Following Treydte 1973: 23f., own completion. 
51   Due to the coexistence of the Conseil de l’Entente and the UDEAO, the overlapping of measures like the  
      introduction a common external tariff in the different sphere of activities of the two unions was inevitable.    10
-  Free movement of goods within UDEAO borders. In the case of an occurring de-
ficit in a country’s foreign trade position, a temporary introduction of intra-
regional import quotas was permitted.  
 
Even though these ambitious measures were important for the UDEAO member states’ devel-
opment process, its outcome remained unsatisfactory
52. The non-existence of institutions or a 
secretary general had a negative effect on the information flow and the decision-making pro-
cess within the UDEAO
53.  
Another reason for the UDEAO failure was the member states’ fiscal arbitrariness with regard 
to their levy of unannounced and additional financial import and export burdens which had a 
negative effect on the countries’ balance of trade
54. 
The fiscal disadvantage could have been minimized, if the UDEAO had implemented a tariff 
pool. The financial means of such a pool could have been used to compensate economically 
disadvantaged member states
55.  
The concentration on development effects only and the neglect of additional development-
related economic reasons
56, persuaded the heads of state of the UDEAO countries to 
reconstitute the union after four years
57. 
 
The West African Economic Community 
 
On June 3, 1972 the only two countries in the region with an industrial structure worth men-
tioning, the Ivory Coast and Senegal, respectively
58, and the economically less developed and 
poorer countries Dahomey, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Upper Volta brought the CEAO into 
being
59.  
According to Baumhögger (1988: 482) the transformation of the UDEAO into the West 
African Economic Community (Communauté Économique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, CEAO) 
can be ascribed to the Ivory Coast’s initiative. 
Whereas to Foroutan (1992: 5) the driving force behind this third West African integration at-
tempt was France. Interested in keeping up its long-lasting monetary and economic relations 
to and influence in the francophone region
60, France wanted to counterbalance the integration 
attempts of anglophone West African around its political and economic centre Nigeria
61.  
 
The UDEAO treaty and bilateral treaties among the CEAO member states stayed in force un-
til 1974
62.  
The pure tariff orientation of the UDEAO was replaced by an organized exchange zone
63. The 
main characteristics of this newly organized interstate trade were the following: 
 
1.  introduction of a common import tariff and harmonization of the different duty 
and tariff regulations within the region
64; 
2.  intensification of the co-operation in different sector policies
65; 
                                                 
52   See Treydte 1973: 24 and Baumhögger 1988: 482.   
53   See Treydte 1973: 26.  
54   See Tamboura 1972: 313 and Treydte 1973: 26. 
55   Ibid. 
56   See Tamboura 1972: 310f., 316 and CEAO 1972, preamble. 
57   See Treydte 1973: 24 and Baumhögger 1988: 482.   
58   See Foroutan 1992: 6 and Baumhögger 1988: 482. 
59   See CEAO 1972: 338. Dahomey changed its name into Benin in 1975.  
60   See Foroutan 1992: 5.   
61   See Baumhögger 1988: 482 and Foroutan 1992: 5. 
62   See CEAO 1972, article 49 and Tamboura 1972: 324. In exceptional cases, the bilateral agreements can stay  
      in force after 1974 (ibid). 
63   See Tamboura 1972: 314.  
64   See CEAO 1972, article 6 section 1 dash 1 in combination with article 16.    11
3.  harmonization of investment and production conditions
66;  
4.  free movement of persons and capital and the implementation of a non-discrim-
inatory legislation with regard to the right of establishment, investment and oc-
cupation
67; 
5.  implementation of a special preferential trade regime
68. 
 
Agricultural commodities trade was free of regulations within the community
69 whereas the 
import of industrial goods produced in the CEAO was in some cases limited by the newly in-
troduced preferential trade regime
70. Moreover, CEAO industrial goods were subject to the re-
gional co-operation tax (Taxe de Coopération Régionale, TCR)
71. 
Depending on their production facilities and their development efforts, the CEAO member 
states were allowed to vary the TCR level from product to product and from export country to 
export country
72.  
In order to reduce the imbalances between the single member states, the losses in tax revenue 
of the economically weakest CEAO members were compensated by financial transfers from 
the union's development fund, Fonds Communautaire de Développement (FCD)
73. A member 
state's contribution to the FCD varied with its export share of industrial goods which were 
subject to the regional co-operation tax TCR
74. In this context, it is not surprising that, due to 
their economic power, the Ivory Coast and Senegal were the main contributors to the FCD
75.   
Both countries predominantly financed the second disparity minimizing instrument 
introduced in the CEAO framework, the solidarity fund (Fonds de Solidarité et d'Inetrvention 
pour le Développement Économique de la Communauté (FOSIDEC)), respectively. Member 
states with a weak economic performance were allowed to obtain credits and subsidies from 
the FOSIDEC in order to finance their development projects
76.  
 
As the introduction of the different support measures in the CEAO framework was on behalf 
of the landlocked countries, the preferences of the economically smaller Mali, Niger, Upper 
Volta and Dahomey and those of the powerful Ivory Coast and France were reconciled
77.  
 
Despite its ambitious objectives, the CEAO had to face several obstacles since its foundation. 
The export of tropical fruits, groundnut and cotton being the economic backbone of most 
CEAO members, the regional trade lacked of a relevant economic basis and remained inferior. 
Additionally, the weak infrastructure of the landlocked countries and the concentration of the 
manufacturing sector on coastal areas, especially on the Ivory Coast and Senegal, led to a con-
centration of the trade flows on both economic centres. Benefiting from such a one-directional 
intraregional trade the economic exchange between both countries increased
78. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
65   The co-operation within the CEAO was focussed on the following sectors policies: agricultural and industrial  
      development, trade and production promotion, commercialisation of livestock, transports and telecommuni- 
      cations (CEAO 1972, articles 23 – 28). 
66   See CEAO 1972, article 29.  
67   See CEAO 1972, article 39.  
68   See CEAO 1972, article 6 section 1 dash 3. 
69   See CEAO 1972, article 6 section 1 dash 2 in combination with article 7 to 9. 
70   See CEAO 1972, article 6 section 1 dash 2 in combination with article 11 and 12. 
71   See CEAO 1972, article 11-16. For a detailed description of the functioning of the regional co-operation tax  
      see Badiane 1996: 183. 
72   See Badiane 1996: 183. 
73   See CEAO 1972, article 34 in combination with article 11; Foroutan 1992: 6; Baumhögger 1988: 482;  
      Lavergne 1996: 18. 
74   See CEAO 1972, article 34 sentence 3. 
75   See Foroutan 1992: Baumhögger 1988: 482.  
76   Ibid. 
77   See Treydte 1973: 25, 28f. 
78   See Treydte 1973: 30f.   12
Another obstacle the CEAO had to face was the multiple memberships of its member states 
and the resulting conflict of aims.  
Apart form the financial development support of different funds in favour of the countries 
with a weak economy, the introduction of a common external tariff was an intersection with 
the objectives of the Conseil de l'Entente
79.  
 
The intensification of the economic co-operation among its members was another aim also 
pursued by the Organisation Commune Africaine et Mauricienne (OCAM). From 1965 until 
its dissolution in 1985, Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Upper 
Volta were members of the OCAM
80. 
 
The most important intersection resulted in 1975 when the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) was founded by the anglophone, francophone and lusophone states 
of West Africa
81.  
The ECOWAS committed itself “to promote co-operation and integration, leading to the es-
tablishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its 
peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among Member 
States and contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent“
82. 
Regardless of the comprehensive ECOWAS targets
83 some instruments show parallels to 
CEAO instruments. In addition to the insertion of compensation and a development fund
84, 
the ECOWAS intended to implement the following steps on its way to a common market
85:  
 
1.  the liberalisation of trade by the abolition, among Member States, of customs 
duties levied on imports and exports, and the abolition among Member States, of 
non-tariff barriers in order to establish a free trade area at the Community level; 
2.  the adoption of a common external tariff and a common trade policy vis-à-vis 
third countries;  
3.  the removal, between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of per-
sons, goods, service and capital, and to the right of residence and establishment.  
 
The economic congruence of some aspects between the ECOWAS and the CEAO can also be 
found in the monetary sphere, with an insertion of the ECOWAS and the zone franc. 
In addition to the intended economic integration, the ECOWAS wants to promote its monet-
ary and financial integration by harmonising and facilitating the intra-regional payments 
transactions, improving the multilateral clearing system, introducing a single currency and last 
establishing a common currency zone
86. 
 
In the course of repeating quarrels between its member states because of the imposition and 
the level of the regional co-operation tax
87, the CEAO was dissolved by March 14, 1994 and 
replaced by the West African Economic and Monetary Union (Union Économique et 
                                                 
79   See sub-section to the monetary integration. 
80   See Baumhögger 1988: 494f. 
81   Benin, Burkina Faso (at the time of the ECOWAS foundation still named Upper Volta), Cape Verde,  
      Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania (until 2002), Niger ,  
      Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo are members of the ECOWAS.  
82   See ECOWAS treaty 1975, article 3 section 1.  
83   In addition to the targets already mentioned, the ECOWAS intend to harmonize and co-ordinate the national  
      policies and to promote different integration programmes, projects and activities in the area of nutrition, agri- 
      culture and natural resources, industry, transport and telecommunication, energy, trade, money and finance,  
      taxation, economic reform, human resources, education, decision-making, culture, science, technology, servi- 
      ces, health, tourism and legislation (see ECOWAS treaty 1975, article 3 section 2 a). 
84   See ECOWAS treaty 1975, article 3 section 2n.  
85   See ECOWAS treaty 1975, article 3 section 2 d (i-iii). 
86   See ECOWAS treaty 1975, article 51 section 1 b-g. 
87   See Badiane 1996: 183f.    13
Monétaire Ouest-Africaine, UEMOA)
88. The literature leaves it open if the numerous overlap-
ping of aims favoured the CEAO's dissolution.  
 
The existence of different and partly parallel attempts of economic integration with an 
overlapping set of objectives undermined the success of the economic and monetary co-
operation of francophone West African states. 
 
The West African Economic and Monetary Union 
 
In the light of the low degree of economic integration and a weakened monetary co-operation 
of the past, the Heads of State and Government of Benin, Burkina Faso, the Ivory Coast, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo founded the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine, UEMOA) on January 10, 1994 in 
Dakar/Senegal.  
 
Seeing itself in the tradition of the UMOA, its monetary branch, the new union completed the 
monetary objectives by introducing different areas of competence, reorganizing its sover-
eignties
89 and including several targets of its economic predecessors.  
 
The following aims are to be implemented under the WAEMU
90:  
 
1.  Strengthening the economic and financial competitiveness of the member states 
within the framework of an open and competitive market with an harmonized 
juridical environment; 
2.  Ensuring the convergence of the different economic policies of the member 
states and their economic performance with the help of a multilateral monitor-
ing process; 
3.  Establishing a common market by guaranteeing the free movement of persons, 
goods, services and capital, the right of establishment for self-employed and 
employed persons and introducing a common external tariff and a common 
trade policy; 
4.  Co-ordinating national sector policies by realizing common actions and coming 
to an understanding on a common procedure in the areas of labour, environ-
mental planning, transport and telecommunication, environment, agriculture, 
energy, industry and mining; 
5.  Harmonizing the legislation of the member states, especially the tax regime, in 
order to support the functioning of the common market. 
 
In accordance with the theoretical argumentation in part one, the following section 
concentrates on a brief assessment of the objectives mentioned above and their contribution to 
trade, regional integration and development. The analysis will be based on a short macro- and 
socioeconomic characterization of the WAEMU member countries and the actual situation of 
convergence in the region
91.  
 
Seven of eight WAEMU member states are classified as low income and least developed 
countries whereas the Ivory Coast, the member state with the highest population rate in the 
WAEMU, is the only country in the union being classified as low middle income country
92. 
Even though the Ivorian civil crisis which started in 2002 was accompanied by a shrinking 
gross national income per capita, in 2004 the Ivory Coast was still the WAEMU country with 
                                                 
88   See Lavergne 1996: 43. 
89   See UEMOA treaty 1994, preamble sentence 7 and article 2.  
90   See UEMOA treaty 1994, article 4.  
91   The characterisation and analysis of the WAEMU is based on the tables 1 to 5 in the appendix. 
92   The United Nations classify the every country by its development status and its income. The income margin  
      for low income countries (LIC) is 755 US$ per annum. The margin for lower middle income countries  
      (LMC) is from 756 to 2995 US$ per annum.   14
the highest GNI per capita (770 US$)
93. In correspondence with its low total consumption 
(79,5 % of GDP) and with regard to the share of exports and imports of GDP, only the Ivorian 
trade balance showed a surplus in 2004. The other WAEMU countries performed deficits in 
their trade balances, mainly due to high shares of total consumption to GDP (around 90 %)
94.  
 
In view of the economically inferior position of most of the WAEMU member states in 
comparison to the rest of the world and the socio-political instability of the Ivory Coast which 
led to migratory pressures in the surrounding countries, Mali and Burkina Faso, 
respectively
95, the new integration process started with a devaluation of the F CFA in 1994. 
The Heads of State and Government of the union's member states agreed on the devaluation 
in order to meet the challenges mentioned above and to boost the economic development in 
the union by enhancing the competitiveness of their commodities.  
The devaluation had become inevitable as the massive deterioration of the terms of trade in 
the period from 1985 to 1992 (-45 %) in the CFA zone and the incapacity of the governments 
to reduce their budgetary expenditures
96 (especially the excessive consumption of fiscal 
resources caused by high public wage bills
97) precipitated a decline of the external 
competitiveness of the CFA zone and an increase of the budget deficit and a high inflation 
rate (35 % in 1994)
98. It was an appropriate monetary measure with which the WAEMU 
member states wanted to counteract the growing macroeconomic instability of the region and 
to maintain France’s monetary reinsurance
99. 
The  effects of the devaluation are complex. The economic activity was resuscitated and 
became more flexible. The devaluation stimulated the reorganisation of the public finance 
sector which in return should foster economic growth in the medium-term. In addition to that, 
with the change of the F CFA parity the WAEMU member states were given the opportunity 
to boost the regional integration by increasing the share of intra-regional trade
100 and by 
harmonising the fiscal and tariff regulations in the region since 2002. Since then, several 
decisions and regulations have been adopted
101. With the agreement on the introduction and 
implementation of a tariff and statistic nomenclature for a common external tariff in 2002 and 
slight modifications in the following years
102, the process of tariff standardisation seems to be 
completed whereas the fiscal standardisation is still in progress. Another positive effect of the 
devaluation of 1994 was the growing conscience for the necessity to reinforce 
macroeconomic convergence in the CFA zone and for the solidity of the common currencies 
of the two francophone monetary unions. 
 
In the light of the adjustment process which followed the events of 1994, the WAEMU 
countries adopted a regional Convergence, Stability, Growth and Solidarity Pact in 1999 
based on the respect of a catalogue of convergence criteria by its member states. This set of 
criteria can be divided in two categories, primary and secondary criteria, respectively
103.  
                                                 
93   See table 1 in the appendix. 
94   See table 2 in the appendix. A detailed composition of the share of GDP by sector is given in table 3 in the  
      appendix. 
95   See McGowan 2005: 6. 
96   See IZF a.  
97   See Rama 2000. 
98   See IZF a and b. 
99   The replacement of the FF by the Euro as a common European currency had no effect on the existing  
       monetary co-operation between France and its associated monetary partners in Africa.  
100   Considering the data of table 4 in the appendix, the WAEMU countries have reached a higher degree of  
      regional integration in trade than their regional counterpart, the ECOWAS.  
101   See UEMOA a.  
102   See UEMOA b. 
103   Table 5 in the appendix highlights the general margins of the different WAEMU criteria and the country- 
       based compliance with these criteria in 2006.   15
The most important criterion is the basic fiscal balance whose ratio to nominal GDP must be 0 
percent or more and which should enable the WAEMU member states to implement a 
sustainable fiscal policy. The non-respect of this criterion initiates a sanction mechanism 
which, in the worst case, can lead to the withdrawal of public financing and the suspension of 
tendering procedures in the country in question. Three other indicators (average annual 
inflation rate, outstanding domestic and foreign debt in relation to nominal GDP, no 
accumulation of domestic and external payment arrears in the current financial period) are 
part of the set of primary criteria. If one of these criteria is not respected the WAEMU 
Council of Ministers is entitled to formulate explicit recommendations the member state in 
question has to implement. Another four secondary criteria (public wage bill to tax revenue, 
domestically financed public investment to tax revenue, current external deficit excluding 
grants to nominal GDP and tax-to-GDP ratio) have to be respected by the WAEMU countries; 




In contrast to the success of the increase of intra-regional trade and to some extent to that of 
the harmonization of fiscal and tariff regulations, the process of convergence seems to be the 
Achilles tendon of the WAEMU.  
 
According to the latest WAEMU report on the multilateral surveillance of June 2007, only 
three countries (Benin, Mali and Niger) respected the first criterion. The ratio of the basic 
fiscal balance to nominal GDP of the other member states fell short of the set margin of 0.  
The implementation of the growth cum debt-development strategy of prior decades is causally 
related to the unsustainable fiscal position of most WAEMU countries of today. In accordance 
with this strategy, the countries in question tried to raise their financial means on their own by 
taking loans in order to boost their economy in critical periods and to pay off the outstanding 
amount in economically good times. For several reasons
105 this strategy was not successful 
and the WAEMU member states accumulated a high position of external public debt in the 
past
106 which additionally limits positive economic impacts in the present.  
In order to minimize their external debt position, all eight WAEMU member states where 
among the first countries who participated in the initiative for “heavily indebted poor 
countries” (HIPC) aiming at reducing the debt position on a sustainable level
107. Since the 
beginning of the initiative in 1996, only five of the WAEMU member states have reached the 
completion point as they maintained macroeconomic stability under a PRGF
108-supported 
program and carried out key structural and social reforms, and implemented satisfactorily a 
Poverty Reduction Strategy for one year. Guinea Bissau attained the decision point whereas 
Togo and the Ivory Coast remained at a stage of pre-decision
109. 
 
The compliance of the WAEMU countries with the other three primary criteria is better
110 
whereas the countries' compliance with the secondary criteria is more sobering. No WAEMU 
member state met the tax-to-GDP ratio and only one of eight countries respected one of the 
remaining criteria.  
With reference to the Commission of the WAEMU
111, the main reason for the diverse picture 
of the countries' compliance with the union's criteria is their inability to benefit from the 
                                                 
104   For detailed information on the sanction mechanism see Article 64 to 75 of the WAEMU Treaty (UEMOA  
       2003). 
105   The main reasons cited in the literature for the failure are bad investment, embezzlement and misuse of the  
      loans, inappropriate conduct of structural adjustment programmes, see for example Kohnert 2005: 2f. 
106   See AfdB 2006, country fact sheets. 
107   See IMF 2000 and for further information on the debt sustainability analysis IMF 2003. 
108   PRGF is an acronym for poverty reduction and growth facility.   
109   See World Bank 2007: 6. 
110   See table 5 in the appendix. 
111   See UEMOA 2007: 6f.   16
global consolidation in economic growth. Regardless of the sensible slowdown of annual 
economic growth the two economically largest countries in the union, Senegal and the Ivory 
Coast, respectively, had to face in the period from 2000 to 2004, an important obstacle to 
economic growth is the low degree of export diversification in the WAEMU
112.  
The variety of the WAEMU exports is limited to contributions of the agricultural and mining 
sector whereas the imports are mainly manufactures
113.  
Considering the uncertainty of the production output due to the high dependency of the cash 
crop cultivation on favourable weather conditions and the price volatility on world markets, 
the focus on primary commodities
114 exposes the WAEMU to income fluctuations.  
With regard to the low share of gross domestic savings, private investments and domestic 
credits given to the private sector of GDP
115 and given the high expenditures for transfers and 
subventions related to wage rises, personnel recruitment and the improvement of the 
administrative functioning, the fiscal situation in the union remains precarious. 
In addition to that the irregular supply with electricity provoked a drop in the production of 
different enterprises for consecutive trimesters and affected their competitiveness. On the 
other side, the slackness of the production of the industry sector hinders the necessary 
reformation and reform process of enterprises (especially in the agricultural sector). It also 
induces an uncertainty for employment and a reduction of the taxation basis resulting from the 
drop in turnover.  
Apart from the weak distribution of revenues and the increase of transfer expenditures for the 
support of weak industrial branches, it is the limited base of economic productivity and the 
persistence of socio-political crises in certain member states which determine for the 




In contrast to the theoretical approach in which a gradual integration seems to be the best 
strategy for the co-operating partners to benefit from their comparative advantages, the co-
operation among francophone West African states is an unorthodox example of regional 
integration. Regardless of the fact that the colonial legacy of the exceptional structure of the 
monetary co-operation with France backs the credibility of the common currency in the 
WAEMU at a regional and international level, it also handicaps the WAEMU’s possibilities 
of action taking in minimizing negative effects of external shocks by using the instrument of 
devaluation.  
With regard to the persistent low export diversification resulting from the export 
concentration in agricultural commodities, both, the exclusion of the devaluation power and 
the fixed parity of the F CFA to the Euro, limit the long-term international competitiveness of 
the region’s goods.  
On the other hand, the income fluctuations resulting from such an export focus increase the 
need to compensate the deficits by taking loans and boosting the region’s development, thus 
thereby accelerating the countries’ indebtedness. Additionally, the meaningfulness of the 
existing development paradigm arising from the Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin model is 
limited. Though the countries have concentrated on the export of goods in which they have a 
comparative advantage, the gains of trade and the contribution to development fell short of the 
expected results, thus favouring the growth cum debt-strategy.  
 
                                                 
112   See table 2 in the appendix. 
113   See CIA 2007, country fact sheets. In addition to the export of cocoa, coffee and cotton, some WAEMU  
       countries export mining products like Niger uranium and Mali gold. 
114   See EU 2003: 2. 
115   See table 2 in the appendix.   17
In order to avert a new debt crisis and to contribute to diminution of the socio- and macro-
economic heterogeneity in the WAEMU by fostering their economic development, the 
intended economic partnership agreement with the European Union should consider the 
comparative advantage of the WAEMU in primary commodities and not subject the 
agricultural sector and its manufacturing branch to reciprocal economic agreements. The EPA 
should rather include an appropriate catalogue of measures to promote the productivity and 
trade capacity of these sections instead. A first step in this direction could be the co-operation 
of farmers in co-operatives and the implementation of co-operative banks. The improvement 
of the coordination between the farmers and the access to money could have another positive 
side effect: the social safety net in rural areas could be built up or extended. Assuming that 
there are similar organizations in rural areas, they should undergo a reform in order to become 
more efficient and reflect the local needs.  
 
With regard to the existence of two trade hubs in the WAEMU and the unstable socio-
economic situation in the Ivory Coast, the extension of additional trade centres in different 
areas in the region could minimize the trade-flow dependence of land-locked countries and 
external trading partners on the political conditions in two countries. On the other hand, such 
a diversification could strengthen the integration of the region and contribute to a 
minimization of the macro- and socio-economic disparities of the member states. In view of 
the limited financial and technical capacity of the developing countries in creating a trade- 
and development-related infrastructure, the European partners could fill that gap by 
elaborating public-private-partnership programmes (PPP) in their countries which meet the 
needs of their developing partners. If the agreements on PPP follow the course of objective 
public procurements, the competition criterion is respected and the need for additional 
reciprocal agreements in other economic sectors becomes obsolete.  
 
Besides the purely trade-related side of the EPAs, the success of the WAEMU depends 
particularly on the seriousness of implementing several policy measures like the adoption of a 
regional Convergence, Stability, Growth and Solidarity Pact or the tariff and statistic 
nomenclature for a common external tariff.  
In that context, a political dialogue with the European Union could have a positive impetus on 
the WAEMU on how to deepen their regional integration considering the experiences the EU 
made in its integration process.  
 
The success of an inter-regional economic co-operation depends in particular on the 
consideration of the negative effects of the historical incidents the WAEMU member states 
still keep struggling with and the internal difficulties they are currently facing and which they 
have to solve in order to respect their convergence criteria. If those aspects are not fully 
contemplated and a clear declaration of belief in development is missing in the ongoing EPA 
talks, the accomplishment of the EPA might be limited to the implementation reciprocal trade 
with unpredictable negative effects for the WAEMU. The degree of reciprocity might just tip 
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share of total 
population, % 
 









    2004  2004  2000-2005  2004  2004  2000 - 2004  2004  2004 
Benin  LIC,  LDC  111  8.177  3,2 55 530  1,2 55 46 
Burkina 
Faso  LIC,  LDC  274  12.822  3,2 82 360  0,3 48 48 
Côte d'Ivoi-
re  LMC 318  17.872    55  770  -2,4  46  9 
Guinea 
Bissau  LIC,  LDC  28  1.540  3,0 65 160  3,8 45 50 
Mali  LIC,  LDC  1220  13.124  3,0 67 360  2,3 48 43 
Niger   LIC,  LDC  1267  13.499  3,4 77  230 0  45 40 
Senegal   LIC,  LDC  193  11.386  2,4 50 670  1,6 56 92 
Togo  LIC, LDC  54  5.988  2,7  64  380  -0,7  55  10 
WAEMU   3465  84.408  2,6 64  432,50  0,8 50 42 
Notes:  
LDC = least developed country 
LIC = low income country (margin : 755US$) 
LMC = lower middle income country (margin: 756 -2995 US$) 
ODA = official development assistance 
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Benin  3,1 2,7  4,7  4,1  94,5  13,6  1730  5,5  12,1  47  14,5 
Burkina 
Faso  3,9 3,9  4,1  5,2  94,4  13  n.d.  4,8  10,8  21  14,9 
Côte  
d'Ivoire  1,6 0,7  3,5  -0,6  79,5  8,3  9695  20,5  7,1  175  14,4 
Guinea 
Bissau  2,2 3,8  1,4  -1,5  101,7  14,5  567  -1,7  2,1  n.d.  1,5 
Mali  2,2 0,5  3,9  6,3  89,3  10  2909,5  10,7  11,5  62  20,1 
Niger   0 -0,4  2,4  3,9  94,2  12,5  n.d.  5,8  6,8  18  6,2 
Senegal   6,2 3,2 3 4,4  90,2  13,9  3731,1  9,8  12,9  109  21,2 
Togo  3 1,5  3,6  2,6  95,5  9,7  n.d.  4,5  15,9  125  16 
WAEMU  2,8 2,0  3,3  3,1  92,4  11,9  2329,1  7,5  9,9  70  13,6 
 
Sources: AfDB 2005, country fact sheets; AfDB 2006, country fact sheets; UNCTAD 2005, country fact sheets; World Bank 2006, own  

























% of GDP 
 
% of GDP 
 
2000 = 100 
 
0 low to 100 high 
 
millions of US$ 
 
share of population, % 
 
  2004  2004  2004  2003  2004  2000 - 2004 
Benin  13,3 26,1  91,8  2,1  55  1,9 
Burkina Faso  8,6 22,9  126,9  2,2  50  5,1 
Côte d'Ivoire  48,1 38,4 112,5  n.d.  148  14 
Guinea Bissau  36,2 51,1  80,8  4,8  23  1,4 
Mali  27,5 35,8 103,8  1,3  16  0,4 
Niger   16,1 26 120,3  1,9  26  1 
Senegal   27,8 41,5 101,7  12,2  511  2,9 
Togo  33,5 47 103,5  5,3  149  3,3 
WAEMU  26,4 36,1 105,2  3,7  122,3  3,8 
 
Sources: AfDB 2005, country fact sheets; AfDB 2006, country fact sheets; UNCTAD 2005, country fact sheets; World Bank 2006, own  














Table 3       GDP at market prices by sector in 2004  (constant 2000 prices)  







































































































(average % of GDP)
1) 
3543,43 973,48 








1)  own calculation 





Table 4          Africa: Intra-Regional Trade Statistics by WAEMU countries in 2004 (in US$ billion unless otherwise indicated) 
 


















Trade in Total 
Trade, % 
Benin  0,3360  0,0909 26,63 2,0281  0,3296 16,25 2,3661  0,4196 17,73 
Burkina Faso  0,3440  0,0563 16,37 1,0191  0,3617 35,49 1,3631  0,4180 30,66 
Côte d'Ivoire  5,6905  1,7714 31,13 3,4953  0,8977 25,66 9,1858  2,6692 29,06 
Guinea Bissau 0,0802  0,0174 21,70 0,1758  0,0818 46,53 0,2580  0,0992 38,75 
Mali  0,2794 0,0173  6,18  1,8576 0,9171  49,37  2,1370 0,9344  43,73 
Niger  0,4090  0,0700 17,11 0,5530  0,1773 32,06 0,9620  0,2473 25,70 
Senegal  1,2085  0,4968 41,11 2,8307  0,6042 21,34 4,0392  1,1010 27,26 

















34,9818  3,01  8,6 33,0146  2,9257 8,86  68,1964  5,8915 8,63 
Africa 
(total) 
205.4623 19.6274  9.55  238.6645 21.9248  8.81  444.1268 40.6522  9.15 
Notes:  
1) own calculation 
2) ECOWAS without Mauritania 










Benin  Burkina Faso  Côte d'Ivoire  Guinea Bissau   Mali  Niger  Senegal  Togo 
Primary Criteria 
1  Ratio of the basic fiscal 
balance to nominal GDP (≥ 
0) 
0,5 -2,1 -1,0 -1,6 1,8  2,9 -1,1 -0,5 
2  Average annual inflation 
rate (≤ 3 %) 
3,8  2,4  2,5  2,0  1,5  0,0  2,1  2,2 
3  Ratio of outstanding do-
mestic and public debt to 
nominal GDP  
(≤ 70 %) 
14,9  20,6 85,4  326,6  23,4  27,9  40,9  96,8 
4  Nonaccumulation of do-
mestic and external pay-
ment arrears (current fiscal 
period; in billion)  
44,7  0 390,3  21,2  0  0  0 48,6 
4.1  Domestic payment arrears   44,7  0  104,1  8,3  0 0 0  20,6 
4.2  External payment arrears  0 0  286,2  12,9  0 0 0  28 
Secondary criteria 
5  Ratio of the public wage bill 
to tax revenue (≤  35%) 
34,7 39 43,2  79,4  25,2  30,9  30,8  32,8 
6  Ratio of domestically fi-
nanced public investment to 
tax revenue (≥ 20 %) 
14,4  32,8 15,5  1,7  20,7  22,6  29,5 3,6 
7  Ratio of current external 
deficit excluding grants to 
nomial GDP (≥ -5 %) 
-6,5 -11,4 3,0 -14,0 -6,7 -11,0 -9,4 -21,3 
8  Tax-to-GDP ratio  
(≥ 17 %) 
15,4 11,5 15,1 10,7 15,5  11  19,2 15,7 
Source: UEMOA 2007: 100. Diskussionsbeiträge 
des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft  
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